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ABSTRACT
Legislative counsel—those who draft legislation for the executive or for
legislative assemblies—are largely overlooked in the Canadian legal literature
and case law. One respect in which legislative counsel appear to be unique
is their duty as guardians or keepers of the statute book. This article argues
that this Guardian duty is best understood as a professional duty of
legislative counsel as lawyers. In the same way that all lawyers have
professional duties as officers of the court, though these duties are most
relevant to litigators, all lawyers have professional duties as officers of the
statute book, though these duties are most relevant to legislative counsel.
All lawyers, when drafting legislation, have particular component
professional duties to encourage, discourage, and even refuse certain
instructions. The article also considers law-society jurisdiction over
legislative counsel, arguing that such jurisdiction is constrained by
parliamentary privilege and federalism.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

L

egislative counsel—those who draft legislation for the executive or for
legislative assemblies—are largely overlooked in the Canadian legal
literature and virtually ignored in the case law. In the broader
Commonwealth literature, legislative counsel are often described as
“keepers of the statute book” or “guardians of the statute book.” However,
it is largely unclear what this Guardian duty entails, to whom it is owed, and
by whom it is to be enforced. Existing accounts vary and are often
conclusory and vague. At the same time, the modern statute book faces an
array of challenges that makes an understanding of this duty particularly
relevant.
My goal in this paper is to better bridge the literature on legislative
counsel with the literature on legal ethics. Existing Canadian literature on
ethics for legislative counsel focuses on key issues for all lawyers, particularly
the identity of the client, conflicts of interest, and confidentiality and
privilege.1 It also calls for further research.2 My focus is not on a general
account of ethics for legislative counsel, but instead on the duty as guardian
of the statute book and the nature and implications of that duty.
In this paper, I argue that what I term the Guardian duty is best
understood not as a sui generis duty unique to legislative counsel but as a
professional duty applicable to all lawyers. In the same way as the
professional duties of lawyers as officers of the court are most apparent in a
litigation context but nonetheless do apply to all lawyers, I argue that the

1

Deborah MacNair, “Legislative Drafters: A Discussion of Ethical Standards from a
Canadian Perspective” (2003) 24:2 Statute L Rev 125 at 141–148 (conflicts of interest),
149–50 (confidentiality), 150–154 (privilege) [MacNair, “Legislative Drafters”]; John
Mark Keyes, “Professional Responsibilities of Legislative Counsel” (2011) 5 JPPL 11 at
18–20 (client), 27–32 (conflicts of interest), 32–43 (confidentiality) [Keyes,
“Professional Responsibilities”]. On conflicts of interest, see also e.g. Ian Brown,
“Sleeping Better: Ethics for Drafters” (2016) 2016:2 Loophole 4 at 11, online (pdf):
<www.calc.ngo/sites/default/files/loophole/Loophole%20-%20201602%20%282016-05-15%29.pdf> [perma.cc/7CDG-RCK6].

2

Keyes, “Professional Responsibilities”, supra note 1 at 13.
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duty as guardians of the statute book is a professional duty of all lawyers that
is most apparent in the practice context of legislative counsel.
My analysis is organized into four parts. First, I synthesize and integrate
the varied and wide-ranging literature on the seemingly amorphous
Guardian duty to identify the key component duties that flow from this
role. Second, I articulate the historical basis for, and nature of, the Guardian
duty, consider the limitations that flow from that articulation, and propose
a different contemporary basis and nature for the duty. Third, I propose
additional component duties flowing from the Guardian duty, by
combining the literature on best practices for drafting with the literature on
legal ethics. Finally, I consider potential constraints on law society
jurisdiction over legislative counsel. As a foundation for this work, I start in
Part II with background on legislative counsel.

II.

BACKGROUND

In this Part, I outline the necessary background for my analysis. I begin
with the issue of whether legislative drafting constitutes the practice of law.
I then explain that there are two contexts in which legislative counsel
practice, drafting for the government and drafting for legislative assemblies
such as the House of Commons or the Senate. I conclude the background
by discussing two particularly important aspects of the practice or practice
setting of legislative counsel.

A. Legislative drafting constitutes the practice of law
Any discussion of legal ethics and legislative counsel is misleading and
empty unless drafting constitutes the practice of law. While there is some
debate in the Canadian literature, legislative counsel are acting as lawyers
when drafting. For example, Deborah MacNair notes that “[s]ome have
questioned whether legislative drafting constitutes the practice of law” and
that “[t]he jurisdiction of any law society over legislative drafters is not
clear.”3 In contrast, John Mark Keyes is emphatic that drafting constitutes
the practice of law.4 In particular, non-lawyer drafters cannot “provide the
3

MacNair, “Legislative Drafters”, supra note 1 at 131, 134. See also “the application of
this set of rules to legislative drafters is ambiguous” (ibid at 140). Nonetheless, she later
refers to “the importance of legal ethics to those who draft legislation” (ibid at 155).

4

Keyes, “Professional Responsibilities”, supra note 1 at 13: “[l]egislative drafting is also
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legal advice necessary to ensure that the draft text will operate to bring about
the legal result that is sought.”5 That is, draft legislation “is not merely a
policy document, but also encapsulates the opinion of legislative counsel
that the draft will produce in law the desired legal effect.”6 Beverley Smith
reaches a similar conclusion.7 In other words, someone could conceivably
acquire the skills to become a competent legislative drafter without
becoming licensed as a lawyer – but such a person could not legally give the
implicit or explicit assurance that the product will have the intended legal
effect. In this respect the act of drafting constitutes the practice of law.
This conclusion is reinforced by statutory definitions of the practice of
law. For example, the Nova Scotia Legal Profession Act defines the practice of
law as “the application of legal principles and judgement with regard to the
circumstances or objectives of a person that requires the knowledge and skill
of a person trained in the law,” including “selecting, drafting or completing
legal documents or agreements that affect the legal rights or responsibilities
of a person.”8 For the reasons Keyes gives, drafting legislation requires legal
knowledge and skill, and legislation is clearly a legal document affecting
legal rights or responsibilities. The Supreme Court of British Columbia has

unquestionably an activity associated with the practice of law and one that can be
provided only by a legal professional in jurisdictions in which the practice of law is
restricted to those who are professionally qualified to practice it.”
5

Ibid at 12. See also Robert B Seidman, “Drafting for the Rule of Law: Maintaining
Legality in Developing Countries” (1987) 12:1 Yale J Intl L 84 at 92: “Like other lawyers,
drafters have a responsibility to assure their clients that their legal product will function
as promised.”

6

Keyes, “Professional Responsibilities”, supra note 1 at 33. See also Ronan Cormacain,
“Legislation, Legislative Drafting and the Rule of Law” (2017) 5:2 Theory & Practice of
Legislation 115 at 132: “[l]egislative counsel don’t simply draft legislation, they advise,
in the fullest sense, on legislation.”

7

Beverley G Smith, “Legal Ethics and the Legislative Drafter” (2004) Canadian Institute
for the Administration of Justice, No LD 98 at 2–4, online (pdf): <ciaj-icaj.ca/wpcontent/uploads/documents/import/LD/LD2004/LD98.pdf?id=947&1566762559>
[perma.cc/2ZEL-PQW7]. With respect, her reasoning is unconvincing and so I do not
recount it here. For an unconvincing argument that drafters need not be lawyers,
essentially arguing that non-lawyers can acquire the necessary knowledge and skills, see
Norismizan Haji Ismail, “Legislative Drafters: Lawyers or Not?” (2013) 39:3
Commonwealth L Bull 455.

8

Legal Profession Act, SNS 2004, c 28, s 16(1), (1)(b).
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held that legislative drafting and the surrounding work of legislative counsel
constitutes the practice of law.9

B. Two main practice contexts for legislative counsel
There are two main practice contexts for legislative counsel: the
provision of drafting and other legal services to the executive branch of
government and the provision of drafting and other legal services to the
legislative branch.
Legislative counsel who provide legal services to the executive branch of
government are a special subset of government lawyers. As government
lawyers, under Elizabeth Sanderson’s model, they have three “layers” of
duties: professional duties as lawyers, “public law” duties as delegates of the
Attorney General, and “public servant” duties as members of the public
service.10 While the organizational client is the Crown, these legislative
counsel take instructions from government officials and ultimately from the
politicians who comprise the Cabinet. John Mark Keyes is emphatic that
these legislative counsel have no professional relationship with, or duties to,
the legislative assembly and its members.11
9

British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia, 2010 BCSC 961 at paras 37–42,
citing New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd, [2009] FCAFC 160 at paras 15–16, which was
cited e.g. in John Mark Keyes, “Professional Responsibilities of Legislative Counsel”
(Paper presented at the 2010 Legislative Drafting Conference of the Canadian Institute
for the Administration of Justice, Ottawa, 13 September 2010), online (pdf): <ciajicaj.ca/wpcontent/uploads/documents/import/LD/LD2010/LD149A.pdf?id=711&16008378
80> [perma.cc/VX6K-58QP].

10

Elizabeth Sanderson, Government Lawyering: Duties and Ethical Challenges of Government
Lawyers (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2018) at xxviii. As I will return to below, she
identifies the “Keeper of the Statute Book” duty as being within the second layer, duties
as delegates of the Attorney General (ibid at 40–41).

11

Keyes, “Professional Responsibilities”, supra note 1 at 24:
legislative counsel for a government do not have a professional relationship with
assembly members. This may seem self-evident, but members of these assemblies
do not necessarily appreciate the differences between counsel who work for the
assembly and those who work for the government. They occasionally lump them
together as public sector counsel who all serve assembly members. Thus, it is
critical that when government counsel appear before legislative committees they
make it clear that they are not there to provide legal advice, but rather to answer
questions on behalf of the government about legislation it is sponsoring. While
they may be able to express a legal position on behalf of the government, they
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Like legislative counsel who practice for the executive branch of
government, legislative counsel for the legislative branch practice law and so
have the professional duties of lawyers. The client may be an organizational
one, i.e., a legislative assembly such as the House of Commons or Senate or
individual member legislators. However, unlike legislative counsel for the
executive branch, it is unclear whether these legislative counsel for the
legislative branch are properly considered delegates of the Attorney General.
This lack of clarity comes from vigorous disagreement about whether the
Attorney General is a legal advisor to the legislature.12 Unlike legislative
counsel for the executive, these legislative counsel are employees of the
legislative assembly, not employees of the executive, and so are not public
servants – although they may likely have duties that appear similar, such as
a duty of loyalty and a duty of political neutrality.
There are also some legislative counsel who might be referred to as
hybrids: government lawyers who provide legal services both to the executive
and to the legislative assembly or its members.13 If nothing else, these hybrid
legislative counsel are evidence, albeit possibly a holdover or anachronism
or vestigial remnant, of the Attorney General’s role as legal advisor to the
legislature.
Thus, legislative counsel for the executive branch and legislative counsel
for the legislative branch share only one unchallenged set of duties: the
professional duties of lawyers. Unless the guardian duty is a sui generis one,
it is best understood—by elimination or otherwise—to be a professional duty
of lawyers.

cannot provide legal advice to committee members.
12

Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Attorney General’s Forgotten Role as Legal Advisor to
the Legislature: A Comment on Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General)” (2019) 52:1 UBC
L Rev 201; Schmidt v Canada (Attorney-General), 2018 FCA 55 at para 82, leave to appeal
to SCC refused, 38179 (4 April 2019) [Schmidt]; Steven Chaplin, “The Attorney General
Is Not the Legislature’s Legal Advisor” (2020) 14:2 JPPL 189; Andrew Flavelle Martin,
“The Attorney General Is the Legislature’s Legal Advisor (Though Not Its Only Legal
Advisor), Although That Role Is Admittedly Problematic and Should Probably Be
Abolished: A Response to Steven Chaplin” (2020) 14:3 JPPL 625.

13

See e.g. Brown, supra note 1 at 11: “[i]n several Canadian jurisdictions, the drafting
office that serves as legislative counsel to government also serves as parliamentary
counsel for the legislative assembly.” As Brown notes at 11, this poses a risk of conflicts
of interest.

122 MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL | VOLUME 44 ISSUE 3

C. The practice of legislative counsel
Like all government lawyers, legislative counsel for both the executive
branch and the legislative branch ultimately take instructions from elected
officials, whether indirectly or directly. It is these officials, not legislative
counsel as legal advisors, that have democratic legitimacy. As Keyes notes,
deference is typically required by legislative counsel on issues of public
policy and the public interest;14 however, “there is undoubtedly a point at
which it is not sufficient merely to give advice and stand back.”15 I will return
to this issue, and the tricky question of how that point is identified, below.
What is unusual, perhaps even unique, to legislative counsel is that they
“d[o] not control the final product.”16 As MacNair notes, this is true because
the legislative process has many participants and may involve amendments
between introduction of a bill and its passage.17 This is also true because
bills are introduced by legislators, not by counsel on their behalf, and indeed
legislators may reject the advice of legislative counsel or even forego their
services entirely.

III.

GUARDIANS OF THE STATUTE BOOK: A SYNTHESIS

In this Part, I synthesize existing literature on the role of legislative
counsel as keepers or guardians of the statute book, as well as literature that
demonstrates similar concepts without using the guardian or keeper
terminology. I draw on the broader Commonwealth and US literature to
supplement the Canadian literature. While the keeper or guardian
14

Keyes, “Professional Responsibilities”, supra note 1 at 26 [citation omitted]:
One should note the role that the democratic process plays in law-making and the
functioning of democratically elected governments. Democracy entails the popular
election of officials who are thereby entrusted with the right to exercise public
powers. Counsel are employed to advise them and, as Professor Hutchinson says,
‘to defer to such officials on what the public interest demands in deciding on
policy and implementing it.’ Thus, it is the responsibility of legislative counsel, on
the one hand, to advise of the potential for a finding of unconstitutionality but,
on the other, to give effect to the judgment of ministers about whether to proceed
with legislation despite that potential. Legislative counsel are not judges and do
not exercise power over ministers or elected members.

15

Ibid.

16

MacNair, “Legislative Drafters”, supra note 1 at 131.

17

Ibid.
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terminology tends not to be invoked in the US literature, similar substantive
concepts are nonetheless identifiable.
Accounts of the guardian or keeper role vary in many respects, both in
substance and in language, but there are key recurring elements that can be
grouped into four duties: competence, clarity, constitutionality, and values.
Of these four, the duty to values is perhaps the thickest and most
controversial duty.
First, legislative counsel as keepers or guardians of the statute book have
a duty of competence, entailing consistency and coherence both within a
statute and with other statutes at large. (This duty is distinct from the duty
of competence to the client.18) Janet Erasmus, for example, explains that the
keeper role means that legislative counsel “are responsible for maintaining
the legal and linguistic coherence of the statute book. . . . [t]hey draft to
achieve the consistency in language that will support consistency in
interpretation and recognize the need for coherence, both in language and
substance between its component Acts.”19 She elaborates that the role of
legislative counsel is “to give legal effect to the current government’s
intended policy. . . . with a view to making the new law proposed for
enactment by the [legislature] operate coherently with other legislated law
and with the common law of our jurisdiction.”20 Teri Cherkewich
emphasizes that the guardian role has to do with combatting incoherence:
“[t]hrough ensuring the seamless integration of new laws and identifying
inconsistencies or incoherence within existing laws, legislative counsel
routinely work to shield from harm one of democracy’s vital institutions: its
laws.”21 Similarly, Katharine MacCormick and Keyes emphasize the
18

On the duty of competence to the client, see e.g. Brown, supra note 1 at 6–9.

19

Janet Erasmus, “Keepers of the Statute Book: Lessons from the Space-Time
Continuum”
(2010)
2010:1
Loophole
7
at
7–8,
online
(pdf):
<www.calc.ngo/sites/default/files/loophole/jan-2010.pdf> [perma.cc/C26G-L3F5].
Erasmus also identifies the “keeper” role as having “echoes of custodian, preserver and
protector” and “encompass[ing] the linguistic and juridical state of the statute book”
(ibid at 7) [citation omitted]. See also ibid at 19–20.

20

Ibid at 19–20. See also Teri Cherkewich, “By Sword and Shield: Legislative Counsel’s
Role in Advancing and Protecting Democracy One Word (and Client) at a Time”
(2015) 36:3 Statute L Rev 253 at 256: “legislative counsel’s duty is to coherently and
accurately translate instructions in the form of policy statements into effective new laws
that harmonize with existing laws.”

21

Cherkewich, supra note 20 at 261.
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coherence of the legal system as a whole, i.e. a responsibility to “the
functioning and maintenance of legislation as a system of law. . . to ensure
the system’s coherence, intelligibility and efficiency in achieving policy
objectives.”22 Likewise, Robyn Hodge describes one of the “essential tasks”
of legislative counsel as keepers as “ensuring the cohesiveness, effectiveness
and consistency of legislation.”23 Here she emphasizes that counsel must
“facilitat[e] its [laws’] accurate interpretation by judges and its appropriate
implementation by administrators” and that law must be “readable so that
the language used and the structure of the legislation yields up its contents
easily” and “generally free of systemic or regular errors.”24 Stephen Laws
characterizes the role of guardian of the statue book as “ensur[ing] that there
is no debasement of the currency of the means by which Parliament
communicates with the courts.”25
This duty of competence is also identified by some commentators who
do not invoke the keeper or guardian role. VCRAC Crabbe notes that
drafting must be “in harmony with the existing legislation as well as with
the Common Law or the Customary Law.”26 By this Crabbe likely means
that legislation must be compatible with the common law and explicitly
identify any changes it makes to the common law.

22

Katharine MacCormick & John Mark Keyes, “Roles of Legislative Drafting Offices and
Drafters” (2002) Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, No LD 94 at 7,
online
(pdf):
<ciaj-icaj.ca/wpcontent/uploads/documents/import/LD/LD2002/LD94Maccormick.eng.pdf?id=988&1600837880> [perma.cc/AS33-2LLC], quoted in Keyes,
“Professional Responsibilities”, supra note 1 at 18. Outside of the context of the
Guardian role, MacCormick & Keyes state that “legislation must be clear and accurate”
at 11.

23

Robyn Hodge, “Maintaining and Adapting the Role of Drafters as Keepers of the
Statute Book” (2015) 2015:1 Loophole 36 at 37, online (pdf):
<www.calc.ngo/sites/default/files/loophole/jul-2015.pdf> [perma.cc/LU7A-KM5C].

24

Ibid at 39.

25

Stephen Laws, “The Role of Legislative Counsel: Wordsmith or Counsel? [2]” (2008)
2008:1
Loophole
39
at
43,
online
(pdf):
<www.calc.ngo/sites/default/files/loophole/aug-2008.pdf> [perma.cc/SE7C-KEVE].
(He continues: “It is this that makes UK drafters so reluctant to accept unnecessary
material in statutes.”) This point is cited at Cormacain, supra note 6 at 133.

26

VCRAC Crabbe, “The Ethics of Legislative Drafting” (2010) 36:1 Commonwealth L
Bull 11 at 16.
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Louis Somarny recognizes responsibilities stemming from what he
terms the value of democracy, among them being comprehensibility,
coherence, and clarity.27
Second, legislative counsel have a duty of clarity, which includes
avoiding or at least minimizing vagueness and ambiguity. While the
literature does not explicitly connect the duty of clarity to the role of keeper
or guardian, this duty seems consistent with the Guardian role. For
example, Keyes identifies an obligation “to ensure that the law is clearly
stated in accordance with drafting conventions”, including to avoid undue
or deliberate “vagueness” or “ambiguity”.28 Crabbe emphasizes that
legislative counsel must see that “any doubt, ambiguity, or vagueness is
reduced to a workable minimum through an intelligent application of
knowledge and experience. The measure of the draft’s success is the ability
to leave little room for doubt and ambiguity, whether semantic, syntactic or
contextual.”29 He asserts that legislative counsel “have the duty to express
legislative policy in a language free from ambiguity.”30 At the same time, he
notes that “deliberate ambiguity may have its uses” and is open to the
27

Louis Sormany, «L’éthique au service du légiste québécois» (2004), Canadian Institute
for the Administration of Justice, No LD99 at 10–11, online (pdf): <ciaj-icaj.ca/wpcontent/uploads/documents/import/LD/LD2004/LD99.pdf?id=950&1566762559>
[perma.cc/HV7M-HDCC]:
à la clarté et à la compréhensibilité de la loi et de ses objectifs pour le citoyen, à
l’univocité des expressions utilisées, aux liens entre la loi, l’intérêt public et les
chartes des droits ainsi qu’à la cohérence de la réglementation et de la loi. Il s’agit
là d’objectifs généraux, mais fondamentaux, qui, on en convient, doivent guider
le légiste dans la rédaction d’un texte de loi.

28

Keyes, “Professional Responsibilities”, supra note 1 at 26–27: “Another facet of their
role that informs its ethical dimension is to ensure that the law is clearly stated in
accordance with drafting conventions. This is not always easy, particularly when
instructing officials may have an interest in preserving vagueness or ambiguity.” See also
John Mark Keyes & Dale Dewhurst, “Shifting Boundaries between Policy and Technical
Matters in Legislative Drafting” (2016) 2016:1 Loophole 23 at 28, online (pdf):
<www.calc.ngo/sites/default/files/loophole/jan-2016.pdf> [perma.cc/5ZNQ-CGFN]:
“There may also be occasions when political considerations prevail, notably in terms of
language that will elicit political compromise despite its vagueness or ambiguity.”

29

Crabbe, supra note 26 at 13. See also “a very serious obligation on Parliamentary
Counsel to use proper words and arrange the words in a manner that makes the
legislative sentence clear, precise, and unambiguous” (ibid at 14).

30

Ibid at 16.
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legislature.31 In the US context, David Marcello recognizes the need for
“accuracy, clarity, and precision.”32 He argues that where a client desires
“passages so vague that they rise to the level of a constitutional problem,”
legislative counsel may face a clash between the interests of the client and
duties “to the fair administration of the justice system.”33 He bases this on
the idea that “lawyers are continuously obliged to support the fair
administration of our legal system.”34 Roger Purdy goes further, recognizing
that legislative counsel “should seek clarity in expression and should refrain
from drafting in a way that is misleading or deceptive”35 and have a duty “to
draft clear, unambiguous, and efficient bills.”36 Thus, clarity may not be in
the client’s interest. Indeed, MacNair recognizes that in the face of
instructions to draft something “misleading,” legislative counsel should
discourage the desired language and may appropriately withdraw.37
Likewise, Purdy states that counsel may withdraw where the desired
language is “outright, perhaps intentionally, misleading”.38 At the same
time, I recognize the implicit acceptance in this literature that clarity of
language can never be absolute, and that vagueness leaves a legitimate and
essential role for interpretation by the courts.
Third, legislative counsel have a Guardian duty to constitutionality, i.e.
to discourage or even refuse to draft legislation that is contrary to the
Constitution. Laws, for example, describes a responsibility to identify
31

Ibid at 15.

32

David A Marcello, “The Ethics and Politics of Legislative Drafting” (1996) 70:6 Tul L
Rev 2437 at 2453.

33

Ibid.

34

Ibid at 2458.

35

Roger Purdy, “Professional Responsibility for Legislative Drafters: Suggested Guidelines
and Discussion of Ethics and Role Problems” (1987) 11:1 Seton Hall Legis J 67 at 83.
See also ibid at 78:
Where a legislator, however, intends to act, acts, or seeks to have the drafter act in
a way that is clearly violative of the rules of the legislature, in violation of law,
substantially deceptive to the legislature, or substantially subverts or is prejudicial
to the legislative process, the drafter should take reasonable steps to protect the
interests of the legislature and the legislative process.

36

Ibid at 83.

37

MacNair, “Legislative Drafters”, supra note 1 at 148.

38

Purdy, supra note 35 at 89, 94. See also ibid at 93; Brown, supra note 1 at 13; Sanderson,
supra note 10 at 40–41.
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“anything in a Bill that offends constitutional principle.”39 Keyes, while not
invoking the guardian or keeper role here, suggests that “legislative counsel
have an obligation to support conformity with constitutional limits when
drafting laws.”40 However, this merely means that legislative counsel should
inform a client of potential unconstitutionality, and should not usurp the
decision-making role of the client unless the “client is intent on pursuing a
course of action that is manifestly illegal and no credible argument exists to
support the constitutionality of what legislative counsel are being instructed
to draft,” in which case counsel may withdraw.41 Similarly, Purdy writes that
legislative counsel should discourage legislation that is “clearly
unconstitutional” and should potentially withdraw.42 Crabbe further notes
that legislative counsel must ask themselves whether a proposal has
“constitutional legitimacy” and “[w]hat are the implications in the proposals
for personal rights and vested interests?”43
I note that in the Canadian context, a duty to constitutionality must
implicitly take into account the availability of the section 33 override in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to allow otherwise unjustified
infringements of sections 2 and 7 through 15.44 Presumably, legislative
counsel should ensure that the client understands that the override may be
necessary and understands how it works – particularly that it must be
renewed every five years.45
Finally, legislative counsel have a duty to values, i.e. to discourage, or at
least ensure conscious and deliberate use of, provisions that are contrary to
39

Laws, supra note 25 at 43.

40

Keyes, “Professional Responsibilities”, supra note 1 at 25.

41

Ibid at 26. See also Sormany, supra note 27 at 5, though without specific reference to
constitutionality: «Sur le plan juridique, le légiste doit également éviter d’utiliser son
statut d’expert en droit pour imposer sa solution ou en refuser d’autres, bref pour se
poser comme le seul détenteur de la vérité dont la position doit nécessairement faire
autorité.» See more recently Donald L Revell, “Unconstitutional: Who Says? A
Comment on the Reference re Non-Discrimination Act” (2020) 2020:3 Loophole 126 at
126, 129.

42

Purdy, supra note 35 at 84, 85. See also ibid at 118.

43

Crabbe, supra note 26 at 17.

44

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 2(b).

45

Ibid, ss 33(3)–(5).
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legal values, including fairness and equality and the rule of law. This duty is
particularly clear in the Canadian literature. MacCormick and Keyes
explain that the guardian role brings responsibilities which “may . . . include
the protection of values associated with the entire legal system, such as
fairness and equality.”46 Likewise, Keyes identifies that “the role of legislative
counsel . . . entails responsibilities as guardians of the statute book in
maintaining the legislative system and respect for legal values.”47
MacCormick and Keyes, separate from their invocation of the guardian role,
argue that legislative counsel should promote legal values such as
“procedural fairness and natural justice,” “access to the courts,” “prospective
application of the law,” “property rights,” and “parliamentary sovereignty.”48
However, instead of arguing that legislative counsel should refuse to draft
laws contrary to these values, they merely argue that they “have a role to play
in ensuring that incursions on these values are fully considered . . . and . . .
clearly authorized,” and “should look for solutions that achieve the
underlying policy objectives without infringing these values.”49 MacNair
similarly identifies an “expectation that part of the role of the drafter will be
to act in the public interest. . . . to ensure that the development and
elaboration of the law includes respect for the rule of law and adherence to
it.”50

46

MacCormick & Keyes, supra note 22 at 7, quoted in Keyes, supra note 1 at 18.

47

Keyes, “Professional Responsibilities”, supra note 1 at 42–43.

48

MacCormick & Keyes, supra note 22 at 16. See also e.g. David C Elliott, “How to
Prepare Drafting Instructions for Legislation – Canadian Style” (1999) 1999:1
Loophole 1 at 5, online (pdf): <www.calc.ngo/sites/default/files/loophole/jun1999.pdf> [perma.cc/J6AE-6TE3], describing a responsibility:
to raise questions of principle. From time to time legislative proposals offend
fundamental principles of fairness – for example, proposals to make the law
retroactive, certain powers of entry, search, and seizure, interference with
individual rights, expropriation without compensation, and so on. Quite apart
from Charter of Rights issues, legislative counsel may have a duty to raise
fundamental fairness issues at a political or other level if they cannot be
satisfactorily resolved with the department concerned.

49

MacCormick & Keyes, supra note 22 at 16.

50

MacNair, “Legislative Drafters”, supra note 1 at 133. See also ibid at 148, raising
withdrawal where a bill “does not meet acceptable drafting standards or rule of law
concerns.”
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Turning back to section 33 of the Charter, under this duty to values
counsel should presumably ensure that the client understands the gravity of
its invocation and the impact on otherwise guaranteed fundamental rights
and freedoms.
Several other commentators cite a similar duty to values. Laws explains
that “[o]ne way in which legislative drafters seek to strike the balance
[between law and politics] is by testing their drafts against certain
identifiable values in the law.”51 In other words, legislative counsel “avoid
producing legislation that cuts across the grain of the values of the law.”52
As Terence Daintith and Alan Page put it, legislative counsel “act as the
internal guardians of values customarily regarded as integral to the legal
order”, giving as examples “non-retrospection, proper use of delegation, and
respect for the liberties of the subject. . . . compliance with international
law, clarity, and proportionality in the sense of the avoidance of excessive
interference with personal or property rights.”53 (At the same time, they
recognize that “[t]he legal values of which Counsel act as the internal
guardians are impossible to state with precision.”54) In this respect, Ronan
Cormacain argues that the Guardian role includes a duty to the rule of law:
“legislative drafters are under an obligation, as guardians of the statute book,
to prepare legislation that is in accordance with the rule of law.”55 While he
invokes a standard conception of the rule of law, i.e. “the rule of law means
that we are all subject to law,”56 he also notes that “the rule of law is the
ideal of the values that a legal system ought to possess.”57 Here he invokes
the rule-of-law criteria of Lon Fuller (including that “[l]aws should generally
not be retroactive,” “[l]aws should be clear,” “[l]aws should not contradict
51

Stephen Laws, “Legislation and Politics” in David Feldman, ed, Law in Politics, Politics
in Law (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2015) 87 at 95 [Laws].

52

Ibid at 96, quoted in Cormacain, supra note 6 at 134. Laws at 96 invokes Lon Fuller.

53

Terence Daintith & Alan Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy, and
Internal Control (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 254.

54

Ibid.

55

Cormacain, supra note 6 at 116. (I note here the connection to Adam Dodek’s work on
government lawyers as guardians of the rule of law: Adam M Dodek, “Lawyering at the
Intersection of Public Law and Legal Ethics: Government Lawyers as Custodians of the
Rule of Law” (2010) 33:1 Dal LJ 1).

56

Cormacain, supra note 6 at 115.

57

Ibid at 116.
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themselves, and “[l]aws should not require the impossible”)58 and of Joseph
Raz (including that “[l]aws should be prospective, open and clear”).59 Hodge
also identifies, within the keeper role, a duty to “ensur[e] that the law reflects
changes in community views”, giving the examples of writing in multiple
languages and of gender neutralization.60

IV.

THE CHARACTER OF THE GUARDIAN DUTY AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

In this Part, I consider the doctrinal character of the Guardian duty and
the component duties it imposes. To whom are these duties owed and by
whom are they enforced? Recall from above that legislative counsel for the
executive have, as government lawyers, Sanderson’s three “layers” of duties:
professional duties as lawyers, public law duties as delegates of the Attorney
General, and public service duties as public servants. Legislative counsel for
the legislative assembly or its members share at least one of these layers—
professional duties as lawyers—and at most two, depending on whether they
are properly considered delegates of the Attorney General. While the
Guardian role and its accompanying duties were traditionally considered
delegated roles and duties of the Attorney General, I argue that they are
better understood as professional obligations of lawyers.
While few commentators squarely identify the origin or nature of the
Guardian role, those commentators that do so agree that it was a role of the
Attorney General and of legislative counsel as her delegates. Elizabeth
Sanderson identifies legislative drafting, and the keeper role itself, as one of
the “residual” duties of the Minister of Justice.61 MacNair notes that
58

Ibid at 121, quoting Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed (Yale: Yale University
Press, 1969).

59

Cormacain, supra note 6 at 121, quoting Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue”
in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 1979). He likewise invokes Tom Bingham’s list of values, of which for my
purposes the most important are that “[l]aw should be accessible, intelligible, clear and
predictable” and that “[l]aw should apply equally to all”: Cormacain, supra note 6 at
116, quoting Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London, UK: Penguin, 2011) at 8.

60

Hodge, supra note 23 at 43. Contrast here Marcello, supra note 32 at 2449,
characterizing the use of “gender-neutral language” as a policy or political decision and
not as a drafting imperative.

61

Sanderson, supra note 10 at 40–41.
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legislative counsel provide their services “on behalf of the Minister of Justice
and Attorney General of Canada.”62 Similarly, while not invoking the
Guardian role, John Edwards identifies legislative drafting as historically a
role of the UK Attorney General.63 Peter Archer explicitly associates the
Guardian role, as he sees it, with the Attorney General.64
Nonetheless, while that may be the historically correct understanding,
I argue that the Guardian duty of legislative counsel is now better
understood as being rooted in the professional duties of lawyers. A major
reason for this reconceptualization is the disagreement over whether the
Attorney General is a legal advisor to the legislature, from which it follows
that the Guardian duty may not apply to legislative counsel for legislative
assemblies or their members. This would mean that legislative counsel have
fundamentally different ethical obligations to the statute book depending
on the person for whom they are drafting, which on its face appears
problematic. While I focus in this article on legislative counsel for
governments and legislative assemblies (or legislators), a major implication
of my analysis is that the Guardian duty, insofar as it is a professional duty
of lawyers, applies to lawyers drafting proposed legislation for any client.
Another reason for this reconceptualization is that the Guardian duties
in the existing literature, as I have synthesized them in the previous part,
resemble in kind the professional duties of lawyers to encourage, discourage,
62

MacNair, “Legislative Drafters”, supra note 1 at 130. But contrast Keyes, “Professional
Responsibilities”, supra note 1 at 13–18, who while situating the Guardian role in a
third category of duties, separate from duties as lawyers and general duties as public
servants, does not identify that third category as duties as delegates of the Attorney
General.

63

John LJ Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown: A Study of the Offices of Attorney-General
and Solicitor-General of England with an Account of the Office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions of England (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 1964) at 4: “In this capacity the
Attorney-General found himself acting as the principal liaison between the two Houses
of Parliament, drafting and amending legislative measures.” See also ibid at 34–35, 49
n 79, 50, 51. Surprisingly, Edwards does not mention the guardian or keeper role in
The Law Officers of the Crown or his other foundational work, John L J Edwards, The
Attorney General, Politics, and the Public Interest (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984).

64

Peter Archer, The Role of the Law Officers, Fabian Research Series 339 (London, UK:
Fabian Society 1978) at 19, cited by Cormacain, supra note 6 at 133 and quoted by
Daintith & Page, supra note 53 at 253: “[i]t has come to be recognized that someone
within Government should protect the Statute Book from purely cosmetic exercises and
this task has fallen to the Law Officers.”
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and even refuse certain instructions. In the same way as all lawyers have
professional duties as officers of the court, though these duties are most
relevant to litigators, all lawyers have professional duties as officers of the
statute book, though these duties are most relevant to legislative counsel.
All lawyers have professional duties to encourage, discourage, and even
refuse particular client considerations and actions. All lawyers, when acting
as legislative counsel, likewise have particular professional duties to
encourage, discourage, and even refuse.
The rules of professional conduct identify many things a lawyer must
encourage, discourage, or refuse, although they might not correspond with
the interests or wishes of the client. A lawyer must not “encourage any
dishonesty, fraud, crime, or illegal conduct.”65 A lawyer must not mislead
the court.66 A lawyer must “encourage[e] compromise or settlement . . . and
must discourage the client from commencing or continuing useless legal
proceedings.”67 “A lawyer must encourage public respect for . . . the
administration of justice.”68 A lawyer must encourage the client to consider
the best interests of the child.69 And a lawyer must refuse to “institut[e] or
prosecut[e] proceedings that, although legal in themselves, are clearly
motivated by malice on the part of the client and are brought solely for the
purpose of injuring the other party.”70 Keyes makes similar points about
professionalism and duties beyond those to the client, particularly duties
regarding the legal system as a whole, illegality, and abusive proceedings.71
65

Model Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa: FLSC, 2009, as amended October 19, 2019),
r 3.2–7, online (pdf): Federation of Law Societies of Canada <flsc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/Model-Code-October-2019.pdf> [perma.cc/6F69-W974]
[FLSC Model Code].

66

Ibid, r 5.1–2(e), (k), (l).
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Ibid, r 3.2–4.
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Ibid, r 5.6–1.
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Ibid, r 5.1–4, commentary 4 of r 5.1–1: “In adversarial proceedings that will likely affect
the health, welfare or security of a child, a lawyer should advise the client to take into
account the best interests of the child, if this can be done without prejudicing the
legitimate interests of the client.”
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Ibid, r 5.1–2(a).
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Keyes, “Professional Responsibilities”, supra note 1 at 14:
Professionalism in this context also entails obligations that go beyond the
particular interests of the client and involve broader, societal interests that may
take precedence over those of an individual client. Courts and codes of
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Likewise, Ian Brown argues that “[b]eyond the government as a whole, the
drafter as lawyer has a duty of loyalty to the legal system and to the public”
– which he supports by reference to the duty to encourage respect for the
administration of justice.72
Likewise, Roger Purdy draws an analogy for drafters “to a lawyer’s duty
to avoid filing frivolous or harassing claims;” “if the bill is not supportable
by a good faith argument, and is clearly illegal or unconstitutional, the
drafter ought to help prevent its passage, or at least should maintain
professional integrity by not participating.”73 Purdy also notes, similarly to
some commentators on the lawyer as adviser, that in the drafting context a
zealous advocacy model is problematic because legislative counsel are not
balanced by opposing counsel.74
I thus argue that the Guardian duties are likewise professional duties of
lawyers, whether duties to the statute book specifically or to the
administration of justice itself more generally. Regardless of clients’ interests
and wishes, legislative counsel have countervailing duties to the
administration of justice via the statute book, which require them to
encourage, discourage, and even refuse some instructions. These duties are
connected to the lawyer’s duty of candour – that is, a duty to warn the client
that they are contributing to making bad law.
Drawing on my synthesis from Part III, these Guardian duties would
include at a minimum several component duties: a duty to discourage and
professional conduct often describe these interests in terms of maintaining a legal
system that functions for the benefit of society as a whole. Legal professionals must
accordingly comply with the law itself in rendering their services and must not
help their clients engage in illegal activities. They also have a duty not to abuse the
legal system by bringing frivolous proceedings or unduly lengthening proceedings.
See also ibid at 27, where he argues that there is:
a unique characteristic of the services that legislative counsel provide. They do not
merely give advice, which their clients may or may not choose to follow. . . . The
connection that legislative counsel have with their draft text arguably results in a
greater sense of responsibility than if they had simply given their clients advice.
72

Brown, supra note 1 at 11–12 (quotation is from 11). See also ibid at 12: “As one of the
key actors in shaping legislation, the drafter has an opportunity to see that it is
consistent with the rule of law, that it promotes transparency and that it incorporates
principles of natural justice.”

73

Purdy, supra note 35 at 118.
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Ibid at 80.
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refuse clear illegality, including clear unconstitutionality; a duty to
discourage or even refuse some level of avoidable and colourable ambiguity
or vagueness; a general duty of competence, including a duty to encourage
or even require coherence, consistency, and clarity; and a duty to discourage,
or at least ensure conscious and deliberate use of, provisions that are
contrary to legal values, including fairness and equality and the rule of law.
All of these requirements promote and protect the administration of justice,
parallel to lawyers’ more general duties.
Another advantage to this conception of the Guardian duty as a
professional duty of lawyers is that it also applies to lawyers in private
practice who are drafting for private clients or for a government. Thus,
governments cannot avoid the implications of this Guardian duty by
contracting out its drafting service. Likewise, these Guardian duties apply
any time a lawyer is drafting proposed legislative amendments on behalf of
a client.
In contrast, any characterization of the Guardian duty as simply sui
generis is analytically weak and doctrinally problematic. In particular, there
would appear to be no mechanism or authority to oversee and enforce such
a duty.
I acknowledge that these professional duties to the statute book are not
explicitly enumerated in the rules of professional conduct. However, the
rules note that they are not exhaustive.75 Given the relatively small number
of legislative drafters, it is not surprising that the rules do not address them
specifically.76 (Neither do I suggest that the rules must be amended to
include these duties.77)
While legislative counsel as lawyers have duties to the Crown as client
(or to the legislative assembly or its members as client), this Guardian role
may sometimes run contrary to the client’s wishes or interests – indeed, the
75

FLSC Model Code, supra note 65 at 6.

76

But see Purdy, supra note 35 at 68: “Although the number of lawyers acting as legislative
drafters is small compared to those engaged in private practice, the impact of their
ultimate product may be disproportionate.”
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I note that Deborah MacNair has argued for the addition of provisions specific to
legislative counsel, relating to conflicts, confidentiality, and privilege: Deborah M
MacNair, The Case for Introducing Specific Ethical Standards for Legislative Drafters (LLM
Thesis,
University
of
Ottawa,
2000),
online
(pdf):
<ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/9238/1/MQ57136.PDF> [perma.cc/T7AL-4X8P].
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Guardian duties will often counterweight duties to the client and prevent
legislative counsel from blindly following the instructions of the client.
Thus, this Guardian role cannot entail duties owed solely to the client.
(While the lawyer undoubtedly has a duty of competence to the client, the
duty of competence I have identified as part of the Guardian role is distinct
from that duty of competence to the client.) Nonetheless, some of the most
important professional duties of lawyers are those other than duties to the
client.

A. Democratic legitimacy and power: Professionalism or
naivete?
I acknowledge that some of the component duties comprising the
Guardian duty, as described in Part III, may seem unrealistic or even naïve
or illegitimate. Can legislative counsel really refuse to draft a bill that is
unduly vague or clearly unconstitutional, or discourage a client from such
instructions – and is it even for them to determine the thresholds of undue
vagueness or clear unconstitutionality?78 Will the client or the person from
whom they receive instructions realistically be persuaded by mere
encouragements or discouragements? Will these merely encourage the client
to retain a more pliable lawyer? And does the law society have a legitimate
role in enforcing these obligations? Moreover, as legislators are free to
introduce, and legislatures are free to pass, ‘bad’ laws absent constitutional

78

On the threshold for constitutionality, see e.g. Schmidt, supra note 12.
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considerations,79 and to follow ‘unfair’ procedures,80 who are legislative
counsel to impede them in doing so?
My first response is that many of the same criticisms can be made of
many of the lawyer’s recognized professional duties to discourage or refuse.
If a client consumed in heated divorce proceedings was unwilling to
consider the best interests of the children involved, will her lawyer’s
encouragement change her approach? If a client in commercial litigation is
intent on destroying her opponent, or more mildly intent on depleting her
opponent’s resources—or if any client is convinced that she is correct and
has been wronged—will the lawyer’s advice that an appeal has no merit affect
the client’s calculus? Even though these exhortations seem unlikely to affect
the client’s conduct, they are at least nominally professional duties of
lawyers – indeed, duties that cannot be easily dismissed as purely
aspirational. These duties have an important signaling function to the
client, the public, and the profession itself. Granted, any practical effect
depends on an adept lawyer who can not only explain why such instructions
must be discouraged but, more importantly, provide an alternative route to
achieve the client’s intended outcome. If such duties currently recognized
in the rules of professional conduct should be abolished, that is a larger
discussion that is beyond the scope of my work here.
79

See e.g. Wells v Newfoundland, [1999] 3 SCR 199 at 223, 177 DLR (4th) 73 [Wells],
quoted in Authorson (Litigation Guardian of) v Canada (AG), 2003 SCC 39 at para 39
[Authorson]: “Legislatures are subject to constitutional requirements for valid lawmaking, but within their constitutional boundaries, they can do as they see fit. The
wisdom and value of legislative decisions are subject only to review by the electorate.”
See also e.g. Bacon v Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp, [1999] 11 WWR 51, 180 Sask R
20 (CA) at para 30, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 27469 (1 June 2000): “Protection
is provided by our courts against arbitrary and unlawful actions by officials while
protection against arbitrary legislation is provided by the democratic process of calling
our legislators into regular periods of accountability through the ballot box.” More
recently see e.g. Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 732 at para 2,
leave to appeal to SCC granted, 38921 (26 March 2020): “[T]he question before this
court is not whether the legislation is good or bad policy, was fair or unfair; the question
is whether it violates the Charter or is otherwise unconstitutional.”
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See e.g. Wells, supra note 79 at 223, quoted in Authorson, supra note 79 at para 39, and
quoting from Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (BC), [1991] 2 SCR 525 at 558, 83
DLR (4th) 297: “legislative decision making is not subject to any known duty of fairness
. . . ‘the rules governing procedural fairness do not apply to a body exercising purely
legislative functions’.”
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As for democratic legitimacy, the lawyer, by discouraging and even by
refusing instructions, is not making a decision for the client or forbidding a
client to carry out a proposed course of action. There are many things a
client is free to do that a lawyer cannot participate in. Likewise, the rules of
professional conduct have democratic legitimacy insofar as they are
mandated and enforced by a body—a body composed of members elected by
lawyers and appointed by the provincial government—exercising powers
delegated in statute by the provincial legislature. Indeed, government
lawyers do not have lesser professional obligations than other lawyers
because their clients happen to have democratic legitimacy. While there is
a divided literature and case law about whether government lawyers have
higher obligations than other lawyers,81 there has been no compelling
argument that they should have lesser obligations than other lawyers.82
Legislative counsel should emphasize to clients that these duties are not
primarily about the substance of the proposal but rather about how the
proposal is executed or transformed into statute. They should also
emphasize their duty of political neutrality as public servants or as servants
of the legislative assembly or its members.

V.

FURTHER
COMPONENT
GUARDIAN
DUTIES?
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES FOR THE STATUTE
BOOK

In this Part, I go beyond the consensus components of the Guardian
duty and consider further candidate component duties on legislative
counsel to discourage particular drafting instructions. I do this by
combining the literature on best practices for drafting with the literature on
legal ethics – that is, by considering that best practices for drafting may
constitute professional obligations of legislative counsel as lawyers. Like the
81

For a recent synthesis, see Andrew Flavelle Martin & Candice Telfer, “The Impact of
the Honour of the Crown on the Ethical Obligations of Government Lawyers: A Duty
of Honourable Dealing” (2018) 41:2 Dal LJ 443 at 449–457.
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As far as I am aware there has been only one commentator whose work can be
interpreted as suggesting that government lawyers should have lesser obligations than
other lawyers, with which I respectfully disagree and which is not rooted in democratic
legitimacy: Jennifer Leitch, “A Less Private Practice: Government Lawyers and Legal
Ethics” (2020) 43:1 Dal LJ 315 at 324–325.
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other duties of lawyers to discourage, some of these duties may seem
unlikely to impact client conduct – but such discouragement, however
ineffective, has value in itself. It may well be that many legislative counsel
are already discouraging these practices. I argue here that they may have a
professional duty to do so.

A. Bad bills (1): Ineffective legislation
Another such component Guardian duty may be to discourage frivolous
or ineffective legislation, parallel to the lawyer’s duty to discourage frivolous
or pointless litigation.
In recent years, Canadian jurisdictions have seen an increase in
legislation that appears, or is intended, to have no legal effect. The bulk of
these proclaim commemorative or awareness days, weeks, or months. These
share a common format: a descriptive preamble, one substantive section
that proclaims a day, week, or month as having a certain designation, and
short title and coming-into-force sections. Ontario, for example, now has
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more than 50 laws that follow this model.83 Other similar laws lack a
preamble.84 Some Acts include but go beyond a proclamation.85
83

Albanian Heritage Month Act, 2016, SO 2016, c 29; Asian Heritage Act, 2005, SO 2005,
c 10; Bangladeshi Heritage Month Act, 2016, SO 2016, c 32; Black History Month Act, 2016,
SO 2016, c 1; Brain Tumour Awareness Month Act, 2001, SO 2001, c 19; British Home
Child Day Act, 2011, SO 2011, c 14; Celebration of Portuguese Heritage Act, 2001, SO
2001, c 2; Christmas Tree Day Act, 2015, SO 2015, c 12; Convenience Store Week Act,
2021, SO 2021, c 17; Deaf-Blind Awareness Month Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 34; Dutch
Heritage Month Act, 2011, SO 2011, c 4; Eating Disorders Awareness Week Act, 2020, SO
2020, c 32; Emancipation Day Act, 2008, SO 2008, c 25; Filipino Heritage Month Act,
2021, SO 2021, c 15; Firefighters’ Memorial Day Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 31; First Responders
Day Act, 2013, SO 2013, c 11; Franco-Ontarian Day Act, 2010, SO 2010, c 4; German
Pioneers Day Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 7; Hazel McCallion Day Act, 2016, SO 2016, c 27;
Hindu Heritage Month Act, 2016, SO 2016, c 35; Hispanic Heritage Month Act, 2015, SO
2015, c 4; Holocaust Memorial Day Act, 1998, SO 1998, c 25; Holodomor Memorial Day
Act, 2009, SO 2009, c 7; Human Trafficking Awareness Day Act, 2017, SO 2017, c 12,
Sched 1; Intergenerational Day Canada Act, 2015, SO 2015, c 19; Irish Heritage Day Act,
2004, SO 2004, c 10; Islamic Heritage Month Act, 2016, SO 2016, c 20; Italian Heritage
Month Act, 2010, SO 2010, c 17; Jewish Heritage Month Act, 2012, SO 2012, c 1; Katelyn
Bedard Bone Marrow Awareness Month Act, 2010, SO 2010, c 20; Korean Heritage Month
Act, 2017, SO 2017, c. 31; Lawren Harris Day Act, 2017, SO 2017, c 32; Lebanese Heritage
Month Act, 2017, SO 2017, c 27; Lincoln Alexander Day Act, 2013, SO 2013, c 18; MajorGeneral Sir Isaac Brock Day Act, 2012, SO 2012, c 2; Nikola Tesla Day Act, 2021, SO
2021, c 29; Nurse Practitioner Week Act, 2016, SO 2016, c 36; Occupational Safety and
Health Day Act, 2021, SO 2021, c 6; Ontario Agriculture Week Act, 1998, SO 1998, c 10;
Ontario Bike Month Act, 2015, SO 2015, c 16; Ontario Craft Beer Week Act, 2017, SO
2017, c 30; Ontario Day Act, 2021, SO 2021, c 7; Ontario Down Syndrome Day Act, 2016,
SO 2016, c 16; Ontario Flag Day Act, 2015, SO 2015, c 21; Ontario Wine Week Act, 2005,
SO 2005, c 22; PANDAS/PANS Awareness Day Act, 2016, SO 2016, c 31; Persian Heritage
Month Act, 2021, SO 2021, c 24; Pope John Paul II Day Act, 2014, SO 2014, c 3; PTSD
Awareness Day Act, 2019, SO 2019, c 7, Sched 52; Sickle Cell Disease Awareness Day and
Thalassemia Awareness Day Act, 2021, SO 2021, c 22 (proclaiming both Sickle Cell
Disease Awareness Day and Thalassemia Awareness Day); Sikh Heritage Month Act, 2013,
SO 2013, c 12; Somali Heritage Week Act, 2020, SO 2020, c 22; South Asian Heritage Act,
2001, SO 2001, c 29 (proclaiming both South Asian Arrival Day (s 1) and South Asian
Heritage Month (s 2)); Stop Cyberbullying in Ontario Day Act, 2020, SO 2020, c 20; Tamil
Heritage Month Act, 2014, SO 2014, c 4; Tibetan Heritage Month Act, 2020, SO 2020, c
19; Ukrainian Heritage Day Act, 2011, SO 2011, c 3; United Empire Loyalists’ Day Act,
1997, SO 1997, c 42.
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In Ontario, see e.g. Special Hockey Day Act, 2018, SO 2018, c 17, Sched 39 [selfrepealing]; Terry Fox Day Act, 2015, SO 2015, c 17; Treaties Recognition Week Act, 2016,
SO 2016, c 18.
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In Ontario, see e.g. Hawkins Gignac Act (Carbon Monoxide Safety), 2013, SO 2013, c 14;
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These kinds of legislation, though unnecessary, do not individually
cause any legal problems. But what about when taken as a whole?
In 2005, writing with specific reference to Holocaust Memorial Day
legislation, Vaughan Black recognized that such laws, “intended to be
wholly symbolic,” appear to be “not deserving of much attention” and that
the study of them appears to be pointless: “[p]erhaps all that is worthy of
note is that provincial legislatures have started using the statute books for
the rhetorical statements that used to be expressed merely as house
resolutions.”86 Black argued, however, that “it is worth pausing to note
which symbols the government elects to statutorily rejoice in and which it
does not. . . . Symbols count, and government action to take note—
statutorily, even if non-justiciably—of one phenomenon but not another
counts a fair bit.”87 More specifically, Black argued that legislation that
grants “symbolic” rights “might operate to cheapen those rights that really
matter.”88
Some commentators go further than Black, arguing that legislation with
no legal effect serves to cheapen the statute book itself.89 Consider Seidman:
“Whatever illusions existed in an earlier, perhaps more naive era, today we
Ontario Trails Act, 2016, SO 2016, c 8, Sched. 1, s 4; Lupus Awareness Day Act, 2021, SO
2021, c 12, s 1(2): “On Lupus Awareness Day, all Ontarians are encouraged to wear an
item of the colour purple.” Pregnancy and Infant Loss Awareness, Research and Care Act,
2015, SO 2015, c 37, s 1; Remembrance Week Act, 2016, SO 2016, c 21, s 1; Rowan’s Law
(Concussion Safety), 2018, SO 2018, c 1, s 5; Status of Ontario’s Artists Act, 2007, SO 2007,
c 7, Sched 39, s 6 [Minister to designate a weekend]; Tamil Genocide Education Week Act,
2021, SO 2021 c 11, s 1(2): “During that period, all Ontarians are encouraged to
educate themselves about, and to maintain their awareness of, the Tamil genocide and
other genocides that have occurred in world history.” Trans Day of Remembrance Act,
2017, SO 2017, c 29, s 1; Vimy Ridge Day Act, 2010, SO 2010, c 3, s 1; Workers Day of
Mourning Act, 2016, SO 2016, c 14).
86

Vaughan Black, “Rights Gone Wild” (2005) 54 UNBLJ 3 at 5–6.
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Ibid at 7.
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Ibid at 8.
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See Cormacain, supra note 6 at 123, summarizing the relevant literature. See also Brian
C Jones, “Our Forgotten Constitutional Guardians: Preserving Respect for the Rule of
Law” (2021) 42:1 Statute L Rev 1 at 14: “ultimately, statutory law is a legitimate
indicator of how states are operating. If statutes contain obvious disorganization,
polemical language, pointless provisions, or other types of pathologies (such as logrolling or pork-barrel legislation), then this is evidence that the state more generally is
suffering from other ill effects.”
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know that politicians introduce some laws not for instrumental but
symbolic purposes. Drafters sometimes cynically go along with their
clients.”90 Daniel Greenberg, for example, argues that this “nonsense
legislation” or “non-legislation . . . seriously damages the rule of law,”91 not
only by discouraging public respect for the law but also by obliging judges
to attempt to apply and interpret meaningless legislation.92 Consider further
his comments about a similar UK law, the Anti-Slavery Day Act 2010, albeit
perhaps somewhat patronizing to backbenchers and private members’ bills:
“[O]ne cannot expect private members to draft sound law: their job is to
raise important issues, and to leave to the government to deal with them
effectively. Being responsible for the rule of law and the shape of the statute
book, the government should have either blocked the Bill or turned it into
real law.”93 In the same way that Greenberg identifies a responsibility on the
government to validate the law, arguably legislative counsel have a duty—to
the rule of law no less—to discourage or refuse to draft meaningless
legislation.
Indeed, Greenberg notes that “[i]t is a fundamental principle of
legislative drafting that each legislative proposition must confer a right or
impose a duty and be enforceable.”94 Elsewhere, Greenberg laments the
abandonment of this principle: “[i]t always used to be generally accepted
within Government that legislation is to be used only to change the law,
and not for advertising or other purposes of political propaganda…. This is
no longer accepted to anything like the same extent.”95 I note here that this
exhortation does not account for, or allow for, a legitimate role for purpose
provisions or preambles.
What can cause serious legal problems is legislation intended to have
no legal effect that may inadvertently change the law. Black makes this
argument regarding the Ontario Heritage Hunting and Fishing Act, 2002,
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which states that “[a] person has a right to hunt and fish in accordance with
the law”:96 such rights “might turn out to be more than merely symbolic.”97
Before moving on, I make a friendly recommendation to legislative
counsel: when next updating the statute book via a good-government-style
omnibus bill, combine these dozens of meaningless statutes into a handful
of comprehensive statutes—the Heritage Act, the Awareness Act, the Memorial
Day Act—with each preamble becoming a schedule.

B. Bad bills (2): Excessive regulation-making authority
Another source of bill badness short of illegality is excessive regulationmaking authority.98 (Greenberg notes that this authority is routinely granted
in statute when the bill itself is incomplete when passed.99) See for example
the Safeguarding our Communities Act (Patch for Patch Return Policy): “The
Lieutenant-Governor in Council may make regulations, . . . respecting any
matter considered necessary or advisable to carry out effectively the purpose
of this Act.”100 (Ironically, the Act lacks a purpose provision.) Many other
Ontario statues use essentially identical language, including the phrase
“necessary or advisable to carry out effectively the purpose of this Act.”
A particularly egregious example of excessive regulation-making
authority is section 2 of the Ontario Affirming Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity Act, 2015, which adds section 29.1 to the Regulated Health Professions
Act, 1991.101 Subsection 1 provides that “[n]o person shall, in the course of
96
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providing health care services, provide any treatment that seeks to change
the sexual orientation or gender identity of a person under 18 years of age.”
Instead of defining any of these terms, subsection (3) authorizes regulations
“clarifying the meaning of ‘sexual orientation’, ‘gender identity’ or ‘seek to
change’ for the purposes of subsection (1)”. (Moreover, while subsection 2
identifies some exceptions to the prohibition in subsection 1, subsection 3
also authorizes regulations “exempting any person or treatment from the
application of subsection (1).”) That is, instead of even attempting to define
or “clarify” its own terms the Act left these functions entirely to regulations.
Reinforcing Greenberg’s comments above, ASOGIA was a private member’s
bill, to which these provisions were added at committee.102 In fairness to the
legislative counsel who drafted the amendments to ASOGIA, and to the
legislative counsel who drafted the original bill, it may well be that both were
unable to get better instructions from the client for the drafting process.
Nonetheless, I argue that those legislative counsel should have encouraged
the client to provide better instructions and seriously considered
withdrawing from the matter, i.e., refusing to continue to draft, when such
instructions were not forthcoming.
While the case law is clear that such a vast regulation-making authority
is not unlawful,103 it is at best sloppy drafting and, at worst, a degradation
of the functions of legislators. As Ben Fraser puts it, “The legislative
counsel’s role involves considering the appropriateness of matter for
delegated legislation as part of the more general role of being responsible
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for the statute book.”104 I argue that legislative counsel have a component
Guardian duty to discourage such instructions as poor drafting.

C. Bad bills (3): Politicized or meaningless short titles
A descriptive and accurate short title is important for multiple
reasons.105 The Supreme Court of Canada has recently re-affirmed that both
short titles and long titles have a role in statutory interpretation, including
for a federalism analysis, as intrinsic evidence.106 At a more fundamental
level, Paul O’Brien argues that “one of the main purposes of the short title
is to locate the legislation in the statute book” – a purpose that he argues
that electronic access to laws has not rendered obsolete.107 Thus, another
challenge to the statute book is the proliferation of politicized or
meaningless short titles. Indeed, Paul O’Brien refers to this as “[t]he most
controversial issue with the language of short titles.”108
Jones provides the Brexit example of the “European Union
(Withdrawal) Bill” and its predecessor title, “the Great Repeal Bill”:
The danger was that the sloganeering and propaganda seen throughout the heated
referendum would now be incorporated into statutory form, through the bill’s
short title. Such a wantonly symbolic gesture may have poisoned the bill’s
parliamentary processes, including its debate in both chambers, and probably even
influenced the reporting and understanding of the legislation outside of
Parliament.109
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As for sloganeering in Canadian short titles, consider for example An Act
To Make Alberta Open For Business, Making Ontario Open for Business Act,
2018, Open for Business Act, 2010, and as a champion budget bill short title,
Protecting What Matters Most Act (Budget Measures), 2019.110 Indeed, O’Brien
notes that “Canada has recently turned the use of political slogans in
legislative titles into an art form.”111
Other commentators note that short titles often give little indication of
their content, sometimes on purpose.112 Daintith and Page observe that “[i]t
is for [legislative] Counsel to give a Bill its short and long titles, . . . the
convention or working rule in relation to short titles being that they should
be short and not misleading. . . . Faced with ministers who want to make a
political impact, however, the draftsman may find himself forced to give
ground.”113
Similarly, Black notes two Ontario statutes “which on inspection are
substantively elusive (and arguably empty), but which have evocative titles”:
the Environmental Bill of Rights and Victims’ Bill of Rights.114
On the other hand, Keyes and Dale Dewhurst argue that the impact of
politicized short titles is usually transient: “Happily, in Canada, the
politicization of bill titles manifests itself principally in amending
legislation. Once an amending Act is enacted, the amendments become
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integrated into the principal Acts it amends. The amending Act ceases to
have a great deal of significance, except in terms of legislative history.”115
As for eponymous laws, most jurisdictions have some, but the short
titles tend to include some parenthetical indication of their content.
Contrast, for example, Sabrina’s Law, 2005 with Christopher’s Law (Sex
Offender Registry), 2000, Rowan’s Law (Concussion Safety), 2018, and Ryan’s
Law (Ensuring Asthma Friendly Schools), 2015.116 Indeed, recent federal
legislation has made the eponym parenthetical: Protecting Canadians from
Unsafe Drugs Act (Vanessa’s Law), and Justice for Animals in Service Act
(Quanto’s Law).117
Eponymous laws may also be problematic when the short title contains
information that is not present in the remainder of the statute. Consider
here the Poet Laureate of Ontario Act (In Memory of Gord Downie), 2018, which
beyond the short title and long title contains no mention of Gord Downie,
not even in a preamble.118
As Guardians of the statute book, legislative counsel arguably have a
component duty to discourage short titles that are politicized sloganeering
or give little indication of the bill’s content, or both,119 on the basis that
such titles harm the statute book by making it less accessible and increasing
the risk of misinterpretation. For example, Duncan Berry argues that
“politicians have been known to use the short title of a Bill to make a
political grandstanding statement. . . . [L]egislative counsel should do
everything within their power to discourage this kind of abuse of the statute
book.”120
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D. Caution: Purpose clauses and preambles
What about preambles and purpose clauses? In the Canadian context,
Kent Roach argues that preambles can have several different purposes and
audiences, with some benefits and some harms.121 Among other things,
preambles “may have degenerated into a form of a political advertising for
statutes that promise much more than they deliver. . . . mak[ing] extravagant
claims about what legislation achieves or hopes to achieve that are not
supported by the text of the law.”122 Likewise, preambles can be a political
tool of misdirection. As Roach puts it, preambles can “provide a symbolic
concession to values that are not really advanced by the legislation and thus
provide an attempt to assuage those who may be concerned about the
act.”123 That is, preambles “can recognize competing rights and policy
aspirations.”124 Roach warns however that, in doing so, preambles can
muddy or delay a necessary policy choice.125
As an example of misleading or misrepresentative short titles, consider
the Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act, 2004, the preamble of which
states, inter alia, that “The people of Ontario and their Government: . . .
[r]ecognize that pharmacare for catastrophic drug costs is important to the
future of the health system,” and casts “home care” and “community mental
health care” as “cornerstones,” even though the Act makes no further
mention of pharamacare or catastrophic drug costs or home care or mental
health.126
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Consider also the preamble to the act which added “sexual orientation”
as a prohibited ground of discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights
Act: “the Government recognizes and affirms the importance of family as
the foundation of Canadian society and that nothing in this Act alters its
fundamental role in society.”127 Arguably, by recognizing or pandering to
the “pro-family” lobby, this preamble undercuts the educational and
transformative message and mission of human rights legislation.
What about the legal role of preambles? Roach argues that as an
interpretive tool, preambles have limited weight, primarily as an explanation
of the legislature’s purpose.128 I acknowledge here that in the UK context
Greenberg mourns the decline of preambles:
The great advantage of the preamble was that its placing showed that it contained
material that was different in kind from the material forming part of the legislative
provisions themselves, and that it was intended to flavour them, and provide
background to their construction, rather than to take parity with them (which
always creates a risk of inconsistency). . . . Their abandonment has, however, been
regretted by the courts.129

It is fair to ask whether courts would prefer politicized or misleading
preambles to no preambles at all.
What about purpose provisions? Greenberg argues that these should be
used carefully: “it is therefore the clear duty of each drafter not to determine
not to use them on theological grounds, but to study their use and abuse
with a view to becoming able to use them as effectively and harmlessly as
possible.”130 Similarly, Duncan Berry recognizes both their utility and their
susceptibility to abuse: purpose provisions “not only offer the reader an
insight into the reasoning of the policy formulators, thus enhancing
comprehension, but most importantly also state what the relevant statute
intends to achieve. . . . [T]he value of purpose/objects provisions has
become sullied due to the propensity of some politicians to hi-jack them in
order make emotive political statements that should have no place in
statutes.”131
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Misleading or overly aspirational preambles can misrepresent the text
of an Act, both to the public and to courts, and damage the utility and clarity
of the statute book as a whole. Preambles and purpose provisions can both
be politicized. Thus, legislative counsel arguably have a component duty, as
part of their overarching Guardian duty, to encourage the proper use, and
discourage the improper use, of preambles and purpose provisions.

E. A counterpoint: Omnibus bills
In contrast, I would argue that there is no component Guardian duty
to discourage or refuse to draft omnibus bills—controversial as they may be—
unless and until there is an indication from courts that they raise
constitutional issues.
Adam Dodek argues that the modern omnibus bill, and particularly the
“omnibudget” bill,132 is “a threat to parliamentary democracy in Canada.”133
While noting that “omnibus bills are neither intrinsically good nor bad,”134
in their contemporary usage “they compromise the House of Commons’
ability to hold the government accountable.”135 In a nuanced analysis,
Dodek demonstrates that the traditional criterion for the legitimacy of an
omnibus bill, a unifying single purpose, has been “stretch[ed]” so far as to
be abandoned.136 Indeed, he goes so far as to argue that omnibus bills may
be unconstitutional insofar as they infringe not only the unwritten principle
of democracy but also a purposive interpretation of the democratic rights in
section 3 of the Charter.137 Dodek considers the dangers of omnibus bills to
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be constrained by many different actors: the House of Commons, the
Senate, the Governor General, and the courts.138
With great respect to Dodek, however, the use of omnibus legislation
short of a constitutional violation (which is contestable) would seem to be
protected by the legislatures’ freedom to follow unfair or inadequate
procedures. While omnibus bills may well make for bad lawmaking, they do
not make for badly drafted laws. An omnibus bill is a tool or mechanism to
add provisions to the statute book, albeit disparate provisions when
misused. It is the text of these provisions, as I have outlined above in this
Part, that is a legitimate concern for legislative counsel fulfilling their
Guardian duty. Thus, I argue that legislative counsel do not have a
component Guardian duty to discourage omnibus legislation.

VI.

REGULATORY AND DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OVER
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Insofar as the Guardian duty is a professional duty of legislative counsel
as lawyers, it is a legitimate basis for law society regulation and potentially
for law society discipline. In this Part I examine some of the regulatory
implications of my analysis. I draw largely on the work of Deborah MacNair.
First, I consider whether legislative counsel for legislative assemblies are
outside law society regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction because of
parliamentary privilege. Second, I consider whether federalism precludes
law society authority over legislative counsel for the House of Commons,
the Senate, and the federal government. Third, I consider but ultimately
reject the more intriguing possibility that legislative counsel are at least
partly outside law society regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction because of
a parallel to prosecutorial independence.
Recall that law society jurisdiction over legislative drafters assumes that
they are lawyers practising law, as discussed in the introduction. Thus,
MacNair argues that “the application of this set of [law society] rules to
legislative drafters is ambiguous.”139 For the reasons given above, I maintain
that drafting constitutes the practice of law.
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Any law society regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction over legislative
counsel for legislative assemblies would compromise the separation of
powers and infringe parliamentary privilege, following the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of Canada in House of Commons v Vaid:
In order to sustain a claim of parliamentary privilege, the assembly or member
seeking its immunity must show that the sphere of activity for which privilege is
claimed is so closely and directly connected with the fulfilment by the assembly or
its members of their functions as a legislative and deliberative body, including the
assembly’s work in holding the government to account, that outside interference
would undermine the level of autonomy required to enable the assembly and its
members to do their work with dignity and efficiency. 140

The ability of the legislative assembly and its member legislators to fulfill
their deliberative and lawmaking functions would be compromised if the
law society could constrain the selection of legislative counsel—by
prohibiting the choice of drafters who are not licensed as lawyers—and
regulate their conduct. Indeed, the freedom of the legislative assembly to
choose and supervise its counsel of choice would mean that legislation on
the legal profession cannot require legislative counsel for legislative
assemblies to be members of the law society. MacNair, while not invoking
parliamentary privilege, gestures in this direction.141
As MacNair argues, law society regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction
over legislative counsel for the House of Commons, the Senate, or the
federal government would be constrained by federalism.142 That is, federal
legislation on the qualifications and selection of these counsel would prevail
over provincial legislation on the legal profession via paramountcy or
interjurisdictional immunity.143 The House of Commons, the Senate, and
the federal government are thus nonetheless free to choose non-lawyer
drafters, who cannot be prosecuted for the unlicensed practice of law.
140
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Legislative counsel for the House of Commons or the Senate would be
doubly protected against law society discipline by federalism and by
parliamentary privilege.
A more intriguing possibility is that legislative counsel enjoy a parallel
to prosecutorial independence that constrains law society jurisdiction.
MacNair writes that “[t]he legislative drafter is often perceived as having a
distinct, independent role similar to Crown prosecutors and ‘judicial-like’
in nature . . . given the special part they play within government, Parliament
and the Legislative Assembly.”144 In her view, questions of law society
jurisdiction are “relevant to the extent that traditionally legislative drafters,
like prosecutors, have had an independent, quasi-judicial role within the
public sector.”145 However, with the greatest respect to MacNair, the basis
for this assertion remains unclear to me and, in the absence of a compelling
argument and a delineated and justified scope, the unique role of
prosecutors and the unique considerations that protect prosecutorial
discretion are simply too dissimilar to those of legislative counsel.

VII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this article, I have argued that the duty of legislative counsel as
Guardians of the statute book is best understood not as a sui generis duty
unique to such counsel but instead as a professional duty of lawyers
enforceable by the law societies. Based on the existing literature, I argued
that the standard account of the Guardian duty is best understood as having
four component duties: competence, clarity, constitutionality, and values. I
argued that while these Guardian duties were traditionally considered to be
delegated duties of the Attorney General, they are now better understood
as professional duties of lawyers. In the same way that all lawyers have duties
to the administration of justice that are clearest in the context of litigation,
I argue that lawyers have additional duties to the administration of justice,
via the statute book, that are clearest in the context of legislative counsel.
Put simply, there are some instructions that legislative counsel cannot follow
and some client decisions that they must discourage.
I added to the existing account by considering whether legislative
counsel should discourage clients from proposing legislation with no legal
144
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effect, legislation with excessive regulation-making authority, short titles
that are vague or politicized, or omnibus legislation lacking a unifying single
theme. Finally, I argued that parliamentary privilege and federalism limit
law society regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction over legislative counsel.
Much of what I have covered may appear to simply amount to best
practices for legislative counsel. My argument, however, gives those best
practices normative force and makes them enforceable professional duties
as lawyers, subject to the constraints identified on law society jurisdiction
over legislative counsel. Moreover, my characterization of Guardian duties
as professional duties means they apply to all lawyers regardless of their
client, even if they are not legislative counsel to governments or legislatures.

